Harbor Shop: what a scan finds, and the order to fix it in.
Harbor Shop is a made-up online shop we built with the mistakes we see most often, planted on purpose. Its keys and passwords are fake. Below is the report Hard Keel Quantum Scan 0.2.0 wrote for it on November 20, 2026, unedited apart from the layout. We will refresh it when the next version is out.
A leaked key or password holds the grade at D or lower until it is revoked and removed. How the score works
Migration plan
NIST's final transition plan (IR 8547, October 2026) deprecates today's public-key algorithms (RSA, elliptic curve, Diffie-Hellman) after 2030 and disallows them after 2035. Key exchange comes first, because encrypted traffic recorded today can be decrypted once a large quantum computer exists.
| Order | What | Uses | Files | When | Move to |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | AWS access key | 1 | app/settings.py | Now | Revoke it and issue a new one, then load it from a secret store. Deleting it from the code leaves it in git history. |
| 2 | Database password in URL | 1 | app/settings.py | Now | Revoke it and issue a new one, then load it from a secret store. Deleting it from the code leaves it in git history. |
| 3 | Private key | 1 | deploy/tls.key | Now | Revoke it and issue a new one, then load it from a secret store. Deleting it from the code leaves it in git history. |
| 4 | Public storage | 4 | infra/main.tf | Now | Block public access. Share files through signed links or a CDN with access control. |
| 5 | TLS 1.0/1.1 | 2 | deploy/nginx.conf, gateway/server.go | Now | Require TLS 1.2 or later, ideally TLS 1.3. |
| 6 | RSA | 1 | app/payments.py | Now | Use 3072-bit keys or larger now, then plan the move to post-quantum methods. |
| 7 | ECB mode | 1 | app/payments.py | Now | Switch to AES-256-GCM. |
| 8 | MD5 | 1 | app/payments.py | Now | Switch to SHA-256 or SHA-3, unless it is only a non-security checksum. |
| 9 | Weak TLS ciphers | 1 | deploy/nginx.conf | Now | Allow only AES-GCM and ChaCha20 cipher suites. |
| 10 | Open to the internet | 1 | infra/main.tf | Now | Limit the source to known addresses or a VPN, or put it behind a private network. |
| 11 | Encryption at rest off | 1 | infra/main.tf | Now | Turn on encryption at rest, ideally with a customer-managed key. |
| 12 | ECDH | 1 | api/auth.ts | By 2030 | Move key exchange to ML-KEM (FIPS 203), or hybrid X25519 + ML-KEM-768 for TLS. |
| 13 | ECDSA | 1 | api/auth.ts | By 2030 to 2035 | Move to ML-DSA (FIPS 204) or SLH-DSA (FIPS 205) signatures. |
This report lists what the scanner found in source code and infrastructure config in the repository. It does not cover compiled dependencies, running services or certificates in use. Hard Keel can assess those separately.
Beyond the code
A clean scan is one layer. Most breaches start with a person: a phished password, a shared admin account, a step skipped because nobody wrote it down. Keep tools that touch production sandboxed, give each account only the access it needs, teach people to spot social engineering, and write down the procedures your team follows. For data in the cloud, use end-to-end encryption, so the provider only ever holds data it can't decrypt.
Files from this scan
- Migration report, as the scanner wrote it in Markdown (
--report). - Encryption inventory, a CycloneDX 1.6 cryptographic bill of materials for auditors and security teams (
--cbom). - Readiness badge for a README (
--badge).
Run it on your own code with npx @hardkeel/quantum-scan.