The Hard Keel quantum readiness score
One grade for one question: how ready is this code for the move to post-quantum encryption, and what has to happen first? The method is open, versioned and free to use.
Why a score
NIST's final transition plan, IR 8547, puts every strength of RSA and elliptic-curve encryption on the same clock: deprecated after 2030, disallowed after 2035. Most teams have no simple way to say where they stand against those dates, or to show a customer that they are moving. A grade that anyone can reproduce from the code fixes both.
The grades
| Grade | What it means |
|---|---|
| A+ | Nothing to fix, and post-quantum encryption (ML-KEM, ML-DSA, SLH-DSA) is already in use. |
| A | Nothing to fix now. At most, signatures are left to move before 2035. |
| B | Classical key exchange that quantum computers will break. Due to move by 2030. |
| C | Weak encryption or exposed infrastructure settings to fix now. |
| D | A leaked key or password, or many problems at once. |
| F | Serious problems across several areas. |
A repository with clean, modern classical encryption, such as TLS with X25519 and ECDSA signatures, gets a B. Moving key exchange to ML-KEM, or a hybrid like X25519 + ML-KEM-768, lifts it to A. Moving signatures as well makes it A+.
What it measures
The score reads source code and infrastructure config in the repository. Test code, test vectors, fixtures, examples and documentation are left out. What counts is the code that ships.
| Category | Examples | Due |
|---|---|---|
| Leaked keys and passwords | Private keys, cloud and API tokens, passwords in code and config | Now |
| Weak encryption | MD5, SHA-1, DES, 3DES, RC4, ECB mode, DSA, RSA under 2048 bits, TLS 1.0 and 1.1 | Now |
| Exposed settings | Public storage, open admin or database ports, encryption at rest off, certificate checks off | Now |
| Quantum-breakable key exchange | RSA encryption, ECDH, X25519, Diffie-Hellman | By 2030 |
| Quantum-breakable signatures | RSA signatures, ECDSA, Ed25519 | By 2035 |
When the scanner can't tell from the code what an RSA key is used for, it counts it as key exchange, the stricter of the two.
Key exchange is due first because traffic recorded today can be decrypted once a large quantum computer exists, and because US federal policy asks for post-quantum key establishment on its most sensitive systems by the end of 2030. Signatures can't be forged in hindsight, so they follow NIST's 2035 disallowance.
How the score is computed
1. Group
Findings are grouped by category and algorithm. Ten files that all use ECDH are one group, not ten problems, so a large codebase isn't punished just for being large.
2. Take points off
Every repository starts at 100. Each group takes points off:
| Category | Points per group | Most it can take off |
|---|---|---|
| Leaked key or password | 25 | 50 |
| Weak encryption | 10 (DES, RC4, ECB, DSA, short RSA, old TLS) or 6 (MD5, SHA-1) | 30 |
| Exposed setting | 12 critical, 8 high, 5 medium, 2 low | 30 |
| Quantum-breakable key exchange | 5 | 20 |
| Quantum-breakable signature | 2 | 8 |
The caps stop one area from hiding every other.
3. Count wider use, up to a limit
A group used in more places counts more: points × (1 + 0.25 × log2(uses)), at most double. One use counts once, four uses count one and a half times, sixteen or more count twice.
4. Credit migration work
If the repository already uses post-quantum key exchange, its remaining classical key exchange counts half. The same goes for signatures once ML-DSA, SLH-DSA or FN-DSA is in use. NIST allows hybrids, so moving to one is real progress.
5. Set the grade
The score gives a grade: 90 and up is A, 75 is B, 60 is C, 40 is D, and below 40 is F. Then the most serious problem left holds the grade down:
| While the repository has any... | Best grade possible |
|---|---|
| Leaked key or password | D |
| Weak encryption or exposed setting | C |
| Quantum-breakable key exchange | B |
| Quantum-breakable signature | A |
A worked example
A repository with a 1024-bit RSA key in one file, AES in ECB mode in another, and ECDH in a third:
| Group | Points |
|---|---|
| RSA-1024 (weak, high) | 10 |
| ECB mode (weak, high) | 10 |
| ECDH (key exchange) | 5 |
| Total | 25 |
That is a score of 75, which would be a B, but the weak encryption holds it at C. Replace the short key and ECB mode and it becomes a B at 95.
Get your grade and badge
Install Hard Keel Quantum Scan. Each scan report shows the grade, and public repositories get a live badge for their README, refreshed after merges to the default branch:
[](https://hardkeel.com/learn/quantum-readiness-score/)
The badge shows only the grade and score. Private repositories never get a public badge.
What the score does not cover
- What runs, not just what's written: compiled dependencies, live services, certificates in use and hardware are out of scope. A library your code calls may still negotiate classical key exchange.
- Reachability: the scanner matches patterns line by line. It does not follow data flow to see whether a use matters.
- Intent: libraries that implement legacy algorithms on purpose, for compatibility, score low. The score describes what the code contains.
A self-run score is the owner's own claim. Anyone who controls the code can change what a pattern match sees, so treat a badge as a starting point, not proof.
Versions and reuse
Every score names its method version. Weights, caps and thresholds change only in a new version, published on this page with a changelog, and old versions stay available so any past score can be reproduced. The method is published under CC BY 4.0: use it, cite it or adapt it with credit. The code that computes it is open source under Apache 2.0.
Version 1, November 2026. First version, aligned with the final NIST IR 8547.
See your grade on every pull request
Hard Keel Quantum Scan is free. It checks each pull request for leaked keys, weak encryption and encryption quantum computers will break, and keeps the repository's grade and migration plan current.
See how it works