HARD KEEL
Method

The Hard Keel quantum readiness score

One grade for one question: how ready is this code for the move to post-quantum encryption, and what has to happen first? The method is open, versioned and free to use.

Hard Keel · Method version 1 · November 20, 2026

quantum readiness: A+ · 100quantum readinessquantum readinessA+ · 100A+ · 100quantum readiness: A · 98quantum readinessquantum readinessA · 98A · 98quantum readiness: B · 88quantum readinessquantum readinessB · 88B · 88quantum readiness: C · 72quantum readinessquantum readinessC · 72C · 72quantum readiness: D · 48quantum readinessquantum readinessD · 48D · 48quantum readiness: F · 31quantum readinessquantum readinessF · 31F · 31

Why a score

NIST's final transition plan, IR 8547, puts every strength of RSA and elliptic-curve encryption on the same clock: deprecated after 2030, disallowed after 2035. Most teams have no simple way to say where they stand against those dates, or to show a customer that they are moving. A grade that anyone can reproduce from the code fixes both.

The grades

GradeWhat it means
A+Nothing to fix, and post-quantum encryption (ML-KEM, ML-DSA, SLH-DSA) is already in use.
ANothing to fix now. At most, signatures are left to move before 2035.
BClassical key exchange that quantum computers will break. Due to move by 2030.
CWeak encryption or exposed infrastructure settings to fix now.
DA leaked key or password, or many problems at once.
FSerious problems across several areas.

A repository with clean, modern classical encryption, such as TLS with X25519 and ECDSA signatures, gets a B. Moving key exchange to ML-KEM, or a hybrid like X25519 + ML-KEM-768, lifts it to A. Moving signatures as well makes it A+.

What it measures

The score reads source code and infrastructure config in the repository. Test code, test vectors, fixtures, examples and documentation are left out. What counts is the code that ships.

CategoryExamplesDue
Leaked keys and passwordsPrivate keys, cloud and API tokens, passwords in code and configNow
Weak encryptionMD5, SHA-1, DES, 3DES, RC4, ECB mode, DSA, RSA under 2048 bits, TLS 1.0 and 1.1Now
Exposed settingsPublic storage, open admin or database ports, encryption at rest off, certificate checks offNow
Quantum-breakable key exchangeRSA encryption, ECDH, X25519, Diffie-HellmanBy 2030
Quantum-breakable signaturesRSA signatures, ECDSA, Ed25519By 2035

When the scanner can't tell from the code what an RSA key is used for, it counts it as key exchange, the stricter of the two.

Key exchange is due first because traffic recorded today can be decrypted once a large quantum computer exists, and because US federal policy asks for post-quantum key establishment on its most sensitive systems by the end of 2030. Signatures can't be forged in hindsight, so they follow NIST's 2035 disallowance.

How the score is computed

1. Group

Findings are grouped by category and algorithm. Ten files that all use ECDH are one group, not ten problems, so a large codebase isn't punished just for being large.

2. Take points off

Every repository starts at 100. Each group takes points off:

CategoryPoints per groupMost it can take off
Leaked key or password2550
Weak encryption10 (DES, RC4, ECB, DSA, short RSA, old TLS) or 6 (MD5, SHA-1)30
Exposed setting12 critical, 8 high, 5 medium, 2 low30
Quantum-breakable key exchange520
Quantum-breakable signature28

The caps stop one area from hiding every other.

3. Count wider use, up to a limit

A group used in more places counts more: points × (1 + 0.25 × log2(uses)), at most double. One use counts once, four uses count one and a half times, sixteen or more count twice.

4. Credit migration work

If the repository already uses post-quantum key exchange, its remaining classical key exchange counts half. The same goes for signatures once ML-DSA, SLH-DSA or FN-DSA is in use. NIST allows hybrids, so moving to one is real progress.

5. Set the grade

The score gives a grade: 90 and up is A, 75 is B, 60 is C, 40 is D, and below 40 is F. Then the most serious problem left holds the grade down:

While the repository has any...Best grade possible
Leaked key or passwordD
Weak encryption or exposed settingC
Quantum-breakable key exchangeB
Quantum-breakable signatureA

A worked example

A repository with a 1024-bit RSA key in one file, AES in ECB mode in another, and ECDH in a third:

GroupPoints
RSA-1024 (weak, high)10
ECB mode (weak, high)10
ECDH (key exchange)5
Total25

That is a score of 75, which would be a B, but the weak encryption holds it at C. Replace the short key and ECB mode and it becomes a B at 95.

Get your grade and badge

Install Hard Keel Quantum Scan. Each scan report shows the grade, and public repositories get a live badge for their README, refreshed after merges to the default branch:

[![Quantum readiness](https://scan.hardkeel.com/badge/OWNER/REPO.svg)](https://hardkeel.com/learn/quantum-readiness-score/)

The badge shows only the grade and score. Private repositories never get a public badge.

What the score does not cover

A self-run score is the owner's own claim. Anyone who controls the code can change what a pattern match sees, so treat a badge as a starting point, not proof.

Versions and reuse

Every score names its method version. Weights, caps and thresholds change only in a new version, published on this page with a changelog, and old versions stay available so any past score can be reproduced. The method is published under CC BY 4.0: use it, cite it or adapt it with credit. The code that computes it is open source under Apache 2.0.

Version 1, November 2026. First version, aligned with the final NIST IR 8547.

See your grade on every pull request

Hard Keel Quantum Scan is free. It checks each pull request for leaked keys, weak encryption and encryption quantum computers will break, and keeps the repository's grade and migration plan current.

See how it works

Sources